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Abstract 
 
 
The mandates for suppliers to commence Radio Frequency Identification tagging 
set by Wal-Mart and the Department of Defense is changing this long-time rumored 
technology into reality.  Despite the many conveniences to automate and improve asset 
tracking this technology offers, consumer groups have obstinately opposed this adoption 
due to the perceived weaknesses in security and privacy of the network.  While the heated 
debate between consumers and retailers continues, little to no research has addressed the 
implications of security on the Department of Defense Radio Frequency Identification 
network.  This thesis utilized a historical analysis of Radio Frequency Identification 
literature to determine whether the current network design causes any serious security 
concerns adversaries could exploit.  The research concluded that at the present level of 
implementation, there is little cause for concern over the security of the network, but as 
the network grows to its full deployment, more evaluation and monitoring of security 
issues will require further consideration.   
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An Analysis of Information Assurance Relating to the Department of Defense  
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Passive Network  
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 
Background 
Beginning in January of 2005, the Department of Defense (DoD) mandated that 
many classes of deliverables will have Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) microchips 
or tags that allow for automated tracking and identification through the supply chain.  
The majority of RFID systems currently in use today are stand-alone, and do not present 
much of a security concern.  To fully automate the supply chain, universal standards have 
been developed to give each product manufactured for both the DoD and civilian industry 
a common protocol for identification.  The RFID tags used within this network will 
consist of passive tags.  The security concern with an open RFID network is that, 
although it will allow the automated tracking of individual pallets, cases, and eventually 
individual products, a third party could read the tags to gain insight into the movements 
of items moving within the DoD supply chain.  This threat could give insight into 
operations or supply shortfalls.    
 
Problem 
As the DoD moves forward with the implementation of this new passive RFID 
network, it is very appealing to reap the benefits of improved inventories and supply 
chain management.  However, unlike commercial applications, knowledge of movement 
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within the DoD supply chain could yield information regarding current or future military 
operations.  The concern remains that as the DoD presses for implementation of the RFID 
passive network, possible security concerns could go unnoticed.  
 
Research Question 
Does present design of the DoD passive RFID network cause any serious security 
concerns that could be exploited by adversaries now or in the future? 
 
Investigative Questions 
To answer the research question, the following investigative questions are posed: 
IQ1.  How will the passive RFID network affect the five components of Information 
Assurance (IA)? 
IQ2.  What are possible methods for unauthorized people to gain information? 
IQ3.  What information will an adversary gain if he or she is able to read the data on 
the tag? 
IQ4.  What are potential options that could increase the security of the network 
should that become necessary? 
 
Research Objective 
The primary goal of this research is to provide a comprehensive review and 
analysis of the literature associated with the DoD passive RFID network and security to 
determine what affect this new network will present to the security of information.  The 
research seeks to determine if this network presents serious security concerns that need 
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immediate attention.  At the conclusion of the analysis, recommendations will offer 
suggestions for improving the security, if necessary.    
 
Proposed Methodology 
Historical analysis is the proposed methodology for this research.  This form of 
research seeks to find patterns of events to determine how they are interrelated.  It is also 
ideal due to its ability to interpret facts from the literature in context and achieve a 
synergy of two different bodies of literature, in this case, security and RFID.  A 
framework specifically designed for historical analysis within the Management 
Information Systems (MIS) field guides the research.  This framework, developed by 
Mason, McKenny, and Copeland, consists of a seven-step process to facilitate the 
research (1997a).   
 
Scope and Limitations 
 
The scope of this research is to look at the potential security issues specifically 
pertaining to the DoD passive RFID network.  Since this network has yet to reach full 
implementation, many changes can still occur that will affect the security of the network.  
This research focuses on the security of the tags and readers of the passive RFID 
network.  The back-end connections, where the readers communicate to the databases and 
software, were assumed secure since they will ride on the DoD intranet, which has strong 
security procedures, and it will resemble current applications riding on that network.   
Historical research utilizes the researcher as the instrument of measure since the 
research relies on the researcher’s ability to interpret the facts.  The researcher’s bias can 
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influence the findings of the research.  Although the complete elimination of the bias is 
not possible, an objective consideration of sources and a close application of the research 
framework should minimize the bias.    
 
 
5 
II. Literature Review 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive review of literature relating the 
DoD passive RFID network and security.  Breaking this down further, this chapter 
outlines the technology, discusses privacy and security, and evaluates security-enhancing 
techniques to provide a clear picture of these different areas. 
 
RFID Technology 
The inception of RFID technology began in the late 1940’s with aircraft 
transponders used to distinguish aircraft on radar (Ollivier, 1996).  Radar technicians had 
difficulty identifying planes approaching as friendly or enemy, and if they were friendly, 
which radar signal corresponded to a plane or its pilot.  Aircraft transponders send a 
specific code over radio frequency to allow radar operators to identify aircraft with the 
location indicated from the radar.  This ability to send unique information over a radio 
frequency for another system to recognize is the fundamental trait common to all RFID 
systems.  The further development of microprocessors and other technologies has 
allowed for increases in the capabilities and affordability of RFID, while decreasing the 
size and cost of the components.  The RFID field is changing rapidly as technological 
advances enable a wide range of applications and capabilities.   
In any application, the tag, the reader, and the back-end database are the three 
main components that make up an RFID system.  A tag must contain at the very least a 
microchip that attaches to an antenna (some people consider the antenna to be a third 
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component).  Tags come in a variety of shapes and sizes based on their application.  The 
reader, often called the interrogator, sends a radio frequency signal to the tag, which 
replies with the tag’s information.  The reader then takes that information and, depending 
on the system, displays the information, shows an alert, or sends it to a database.   
Many different designs and sizes exist for RFID tags, but the two primary types 
are active and passive.  Active tags have a battery that allows them to work at distances 
ranging from about 100 meters to kilometers depending on antenna, power, and 
frequency (EPCglobal, 2004).  The active tags are usually slightly larger and more 
expensive than passive tags since they need a battery and typically can perform more 
functions.  Passive RFID tags consist of only a microchip and an antenna, and they draw 
power from the electromagnetic (EM) signal the reader transmits.  That signal induces a 
current in the tag’s antenna (EPCglobal, 2004).  The figures below depict several 
different types of passive RFID tags. 
 
Figure 1:  An Implantable RFID Tag (VeriChip Corperation, 2004) 
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Figure 2:  Michelin’s RFID Tag for Tracking Tires (“Michelin Embeds RFID Tags 
in Tires,” 2003) 
   
Figure 3:  Various Tag Designs (“RFID – The Technology,” 2002) 
 
The passive tags are typically smaller, cheaper and can last up to 20 years (Accenture, 
2001).  The passive tag works much like a mirror—it reflects the Radio Frequency (RF) 
energy from the EM signal, only the returning signal contains some sort of information, 
such as a serial number.  Passive tags have a read range of about 3 meters depending on 
the reader and the antenna on the tag (EPCglobal, 2004).  However, new designs in 
certain frequency ranges have enabled read distances under optimal conditions up to 15 
meters (Cravotta, 2004).  Another subtype of passive, called semi-passive also exists.  
Semi-passive tags have batteries that can be used for on board sensors, like temperature 
or pressure, or to assist in the read distance—they still rely on the reader field for 
communication, however (Lewis, 2004).     
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Tags also vary by the capability of being read-only or read-write.  A read-write 
version can be changed or erased as tags progress through a supply chain or system.  
After the initial writing process, read-only tags do not allow changes to the information.    
Since the tags communicate to the reader over a radio frequency, the frequency 
will determine many of the characteristics of the system.  “The choice of operating 
frequency affects the reading distance, interference with other radio systems, 
communication data speed and antenna size.  Low frequency systems typically use 
passive tags whereas higher frequency systems operate with active tags” (Accenture, 
2001, p. 5).  At lower frequencies, the antennas need to be larger, the data rates are 
slower, and the read range, the distance between the tag and the reader necessary for 
communication, is smaller.  Higher frequencies need more line-of-sight between the tag 
and the reader because the higher EM waves do not pass through non-transparent objects 
as well as lower frequencies (2001).  The operating frequency also complicates RFID 
networks because regions of the world allocate frequencies differently—a system 
utilizing a certain frequency here in the U.S. may find that its frequency is not compatible 
or approved for use in Europe or Japan.  Five main operating frequencies for RFID 
networks exist globally, circa 130 kHz, 13.56 MHz, 860-960 MHz (UHF), 2.45 GHz, and 
5.7GHz, but all are not necessarily available in all regions of the world (Delnicki, 2004).  
The UHF range is appealing because its typical read distance is between 6.4 and 7.0 
meters, compared to about 0.5 meters for the frequencies lower than UHF and under 2.0 
meters for the frequencies higher than UHF (2004).  Different frequencies work better in 
different conditions and applications, so no one frequency is ideal in every situation.   
 
9 
By using different frequencies and advances in microchip technology, 
applications go far beyond the aircraft industry.  RFID tags decreased in size—some are 
smaller than a grain of sand—this smaller size, coupled with decreasing costs and the 
ability to carry a significant amount of information make RFID an attractive option for 
many processes. 
 
Figure 4:  RFID Microprocessors Next to an Ant (Meloan, 2003) 
 
Garage door openers and systems used to identify cars in case of theft are examples of 
applications for active tags we use everyday.  The advances in passive tags have enabled 
drive through highway tolls, secure entry cards, and identification for livestock and pets.  
Passive tags have the potential for forgery prevention on gift certificates or even money 
(Takaragi, Usami, Imura, Itsuki, & Satoh, 2001, p. 45).  The use of RFID technology is 
not new to the DoD.  The “DoD currently operates the largest end-to-end active RFID 
system in the world…DLA [Defense Logistic Agency] and DDC [Defense Distribution 
Center] currently use active RFID tags on Air Lines of Communication (ALOC) pallets 
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and seavans that are sent to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)” (Walter-Groft, 2004, 
p. 10).  The RFID technology proves useful in many applications, but the majority of 
systems utilizing RFID are close-looped as in the current system used by the DLA and 
the DCC.  Close-loop, or stand-alone systems that utilize RFID typically operate only 
with themselves.  For instance, a secure entry card operates only with the reader at the 
door; the format of the information or data communicated does not work with another 
system.  The anticipated major application for RFID will be the implementation of RFID 
in the supply chain where it will operate as an open network with a common protocol.   
Bar codes are instrumental as a data capture technique in nearly any application 
used to transfer data.  The zebra pattern of bar codes is seen everyday, and the bar codes 
speed up consumer shopping, package shipping, and inventory tracking.  RFID offers 
many advantages over bar codes, as the table below shows: 
Table 1:  Bar code vs. Passive RFID (Accenture, 2001, p. 3) 
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Data transmission occurs optically with bar codes and through EM waves for RFID.  The 
data volumes are similar for bar codes and RFID when looking at passive tags, but 
specialty systems for RFID have the capability to transfer significantly more data.  Data 
modification, addressed earlier as read-write, remains an option for RFID.  The scanner 
must “see” the bar codes for visual contact, while RFID tags pass information from 
within the packaging; the EM waves pass through most materials.  Water and metal do 
not pass EM waves very well at most frequencies (Henning, Ladkin, & Sieker, 2004, p. 1; 
Sarma, Weis, & Engels, 2002, p. 465), but design considerations and packaging make it 
possible to use RFID (EPCglobal, 2004).  The read distances for both bar codes and 
RFID are difficult to assess since both possess so many design considerations that affect 
read distance.  Access security refers to the security of the data, and RFID has the ability 
to use authentication and encryption.  This ability allows for protection of the data with 
passwords or for the encryption of the transmitted data.  Bar codes are susceptible to 
environment damage that can render it unreadable; whereas, RFID tags remain readable 
against “dirt, frost, humidity, grease, and in the sunlight” (Accenture, 2001, p. 4).   
Finally, one of the most significant advantages of RFID is the advent of anti-collision.  
Anti-collision allows an RFID reader to read and/or write to multiple tags at one time, 
which is not possible for bar codes.  Despite the many advantages RFID over bar codes, 
drawbacks do exist (2001). 
The main element preventing RFID widespread use has been cost.  In 2001, a 
cheap tag cost $0.50, but the ultimate goal for the RFID industry is to produce unique 64-
bit or 96-bit, tags that cost $0.05 (Sarma, 2001).  However, estimates that are more recent 
are encouraging.  Alien Technology, an RFID developer, “does predict that in quantities 
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of 1 billion, RFID tags will approach 10 cents each, and in lots of 10 billion, the 
industry’s holy grail of 5 cents” (McCullagh, 2003, p. 1).   
Joe Dunlap, a supply chain specialist from Siemens Dematic, highlighted other 
concerns in addition to cost saying, “There will be exceptions where RFID tags fail or 
become damaged and human readable information is always required…If bar codes ever 
go away, it will be a long time from now” (Material Handling Management Staff, 2004, 
p. 24).  RFID may not completely replace bar codes, as bar codes are cheap and will 
remain in use, but in many applications RFID can become the primary means of 
identification.  According to the Military Marking for Shipment and Storage, MIL-STD-
129P, unless otherwise specified in the contract, “identification bar code markings are  
required for DoD and contractor- or vendor- originated shipments” (Department of 
Defense Standard Practice, 2004, p. 46).   
 
Mandates on the Passive RFID Network 
On 4 June 2003, Wal-Mart directed that its 100 top suppliers would deliver all 
cases and pallets with RFID tags by 1 January 2005 (Barlas, 2003).  The U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) followed Wal-Mart’s lead and on 23 October 2003 also required that 
its top 100 vendors begin using RFID tags for tracking cases and pallets by January 2005 
(Department of Defense, 2003).  At the time of both mandates, no universal standards for 
interoperability existed for the data format on the RFID tags.  Tom Torre, supply chain 
innovation group leader for Procter & Gamble, voiced his concerns stating, “Currently 
there are approximately 122 RFID protocols globally.  They all work, but few work with 
each other” (Material Handling Management Staff, 2004, p. 24).  The group in charge of 
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developing the standards for the RFID network is EPCglobal, Inc.  EPCglobal is a joint 
venture between EAN-International (European Article Numbering Association) 
International and the Uniform Code Council (UCC) governed by a diverse board of key 
members (EPCglobal, 2004).  EPC stands for Electronic Product Code, and it will be the 
standard for RFID; much the same as the bar code standard for the Universal Product 
Code (UPC).  Their approach puts emphasis on:  
“Finding cheap, high performance tags and readers, making the electronic 
product code [EPC] a common language for everyone to use in the 
commercial supply chain, and finally, establishing the information 
network to form the data backbone of the system.” (Material Handling 
Management Staff, 2004, p. 24) 
Essentially, EPCglobal will direct the common language that the global RFID network 
will employ.   
 Another key player in the development of the passive RFID network will be the 
Association for Automatic Identification and Mobility, more commonly known as AIM 
Global.  AIM Global “is a global trade association comprising providers of components, 
networks, systems, and services that manage the collection and integration of data with 
information management systems” (AIM Global, 2004, p. 2).  AIM Global is the 
organization representing the manufacturers and service providers of RFID technology; 
their purpose is to solve the technological issues in the development of the passive RFID 
network.   
 In latest policy direction by the DoD released 30 July 2004, the rules for the 
implementation of passive RFID network is established (The Under Secretary of Defense, 
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2004a).  Commencing on 1 January 2005, all case, pallet, and item packaging for 
packaged operational rations, clothing, individual equipment, tools, personal demand 
items, and weapon system repair parts and components delivered to the defense 
distribution depots of Susquehanna, PA and San Joaquin, CA will have RFID tags 
(2004a, p. 3-1).  These tags will be within the approved frequency range, which is in the 
UHF range of 860-960 MHz, with a minimum read distance of three meters (2004a, p. 2-
4).  Furthermore, the tags will be EPC Class 0 and Class 1 tags (2004a, p. 1).   
Table 2:  Summary of RFID Tag Classes (Lewis, 2004, p. 9) 
 
Table 2 outlines each of the RFID tag classes and their applications.   The “EAS” 
(electronic article surveillance) portion of the Class 0 tags, above, applies to tags used for 
theft prevention and contain no data on the tag.  EAS tags simply notify the reader that a 
tag has passed it.  Essentially the Class 0 and Class 1 tags utilized by the DoD passive 
network will remain read-only since they are factory programmed and can only be 
written once (Auto-ID Center, 2003, p. 10; Auto-ID Center, 2002, p. 7).  By 1 January 
2006, several more products delivered to nearly all the major defense depots will require 
RFID tags.   
Two tag data formats or protocols are approved for the data on the tags: the DoD 
and the EPC tag data construct.  The EPC tag data construct is appealing for 
manufactures that also deliver to the commercial supply chain since the manufacturers 
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can use one tag data construct for both DoD and commercial products.  The DoD EPC 
network will support 64-bit and 96-bit tags, but the DoD directs transition to 96-bit tags 
“as soon as practicable” (The Under Secretary of Defense, 2004a, p. 2-9).  The number of 
bits refers to the number of “1”s and “0”s actually on the tag, which represents the 
amount of space on the tag to write data.  Figure 6, displays the format for the EPC 96-bit 
construct.   
 
Figure 5:  Example of EPC Tag Data Construct for 96-bit Tag Type 1 (EPCglobal, 
2004) 
 
The EPC format will provide the following types of information:  the length, type, 
structure, version, and generation (Header), the entity responsible for maintaining the 
subsequent partitions of the EPC, which is usually the brand owner of the item or the 
company owning the location (EPC manager), the class of the item (Object Class), and 
finally a unique serial number (Serial Number).  The EPC Manager of the EPC will be 
similar to an Internet Protocol (IP) address in computer networking.  With 28 bits 
allocated for the EPC Manager, this allows for 2^28, or 268 million addresses for the 
manufacturers.  Each manufacturer would have its own prefix, and allows for identify 
2^24, or 16 million different prefixes for products in the object class portion.  Finally, the 
serial number portion allows for 2^36, or 68 billion of each object class to be identified 
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uniquely.  The capability for unique identification gives the government, commercial 
suppliers, and end-users the ability to track every item in the supply chain uniquely.   
The DoD tag construct will resemble the EPC tag construct with a few 
differences.  In figure 7, the 96-bit DoD construct is displayed: 
 
Figure 6:  Example of DoD 96-bit Tag Construct (The Under Secretary of Defense, 
2004a, p. 2-8) 
 
Under this construct, the header will be encoded “11001111,” which will designate the 
tag as the DoD tag construct.  The filter value will designate whether the tag is used for a 
pallet, case, or a Unique Identification (UID) item.  The DODAAC/CAGE, also referred 
to as the Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code or the Government Managed 
Identifier, is a five-position alpha-numeric code, represented by 48 bits, which,  
“identifies the supplier and ensures uniqueness of serial number across all suppliers” (The 
Under Secretary of Defense, 2004c, p. 18).  Finally, the serial number contains 36 bits to 
allow for 2^36 unique serial numbers under each CAGE code.   
On 29 July 2003, the acting Under Secretary of Defense made UID a mandatory 
DoD requirement on all solicitations issued on or after 1 January 2004 (The Under 
Secretary of Defense, 2004b).  UID is “the set of data for tangible assets that is globally 
unique and unambiguous ensures data integrity and data quality throughout life, and 
supports multi-faceted business applications and users” 2004b, p. 3).  UID will be 
required for all contracts or delivery orders for tangible items if:  
1. Unit acquisition cost is over $5,000 
2. Item is serially managed 
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3. Item is mission essential  
4. Item is controlled inventory 
5. A consumable item or material where permanent identification is necessary 
(2004b, p. 9) 
 
Linear and 2-dimenional bar codes can provide UID, but UID will be mandatory on 
RFID tags beginning 1 January 2007 (Department of Defense Standard Practice, 2004).  
RFID will be a key enabler for the UID program because it already has the capabilities 
for UID built into the tag data construct.   
 
Information Assurance 
Before discussing Information Assurance (IA), a proper definition is necessary.  
Information Assurance consists of: 
“Measures that protect and defend information and information systems 
by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and 
non-repudiation.  This includes providing for restoration of information 
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.” 
(DoD Directive 8500.1, 2002, p. 2) 
In a working paper from the National Defense University on IA, the concerns over new 
commercial technologies were highlighted, “The introduction and adoption by industry of 
such new technologies as wireless, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP), and Radio 
Frequency Identification Devices (RFID) are rapid, with little design concern for security 
and privacy” (Gansler & Binnenkijk, 2003, p. 3).  The paper continues stating, 
“Introduction of this technology [wireless, VOIP, & RFID] in the commercial market is 
based on user acceptability, legal consequences, and bottom line cost analysis, not on 
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safety, potential loss of life, or national security policy considerations” (2003, p. 3).  
Specific problems were not explicitly identified, but the paper identifies the potential 
problem when technology developed commercially crosses into DoD applications.   The 
passive RFID network does provide huge potential benefits for the DoD supply network, 
but this needs to be carefully balanced against the potential threats.   
Joint Publication 3-13 discusses how joint forces will utilize Information 
Operations (IO) to support the national military strategy (Joint Pub 3-13, 1998, p. 2).  The 
two major delineations of IO are offensive and defensive operations.  Offensive IO 
involves utilizing resources to disrupt adversary decision makers or achieve certain 
objectives, while defensive IO aims to consolidate a host of techniques to “protect and 
defend information and information systems,” (1998, p. viii).  One of the primary 
methods of achieving defensive IO lies in the IA program.  The DoD IA program: 
“Protects and defends information and information systems by ensuring 
their availability, integrity, identification and authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This includes providing for the 
restoration of information systems by incorporation protection, detection, 
and reaction capabilities.  IA employs technologies and processes such as 
multilevel security, access controls, secure network servers, and intrusion 
detection software.” (1998, p. III-1)    
IA focuses on five areas to protect assets of the DoD.  Figure 7, below highlights each of 
the five areas and provides a brief description.   
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Figure 7:  Areas of Information Assurance (Joint Pub 3-13, 1998, p. III-3) 
Although this graphic provides a broad overview of the five elements of IA, more 
specific definitions are necessary to determine how they may affect the DoD passive 
RFID network.  The definitions according to the DoD Directive 8500.1 and the National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Instruction (NSTISSI) No. 4009, 
which serves as the National Information Assurance Glossary, are as follows: 
• Authentication:  Security measure designed to establish the validity of a 
transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an individual's 
authorization to receive specific categories of information.  
• Availability:  Timely, reliable access to data and information services for 
authorized users.  
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• Integrity:  Quality of an IS [Information Systems] reflecting the logical 
correctness and reliability of the operating system; the logical completeness of the 
hardware and software implementing the protection mechanisms; and the 
consistency of the data structures and occurrence of the stored data. Note that, in a 
formal security mode, integrity is interpreted more narrowly to mean protection 
against unauthorized modification or destruction of information.  
• Non-repudiation:  Assurance the sender of data is provided with proof of 
delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender's identity, so 
neither can later deny having processed the data.  
• Confidentiality:  Assurance that information is not disclosed to unauthorized 
individuals, processes, or devices.  (2002, pp. 17-22; 2003, pp. 4-44) 
Before applying the components of IA to the DoD passive network, a restatement 
of a few factors of the network is necessary.  All items shipped will possess shipping 
labels and bar codes in addition to RFID tags.  The RFID tags will be Class 0 and Class 
1, which means that they will be read-only.  The databases that RFID utilizes to track 
inventory ride on a DoD intranet network.  Kevin Ashton, Vice President of marketing of 
a reader manufacturer, stated that, “everything from the reader back is very standard 
internet infrastructure…so you have all the same security issues and opportunities that 
you have with the Internet” (Hulme & Claburn, 2004, p. 3).  This analysis does not 
extend to possible vulnerabilities associated with the databases and software running on 
the DoD intranet.  Since this portion of the network is standard internet infrastructure, the 
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analysis focuses on the portions of the RFID technology that is new and makes the 
network unique.   
First looking at authentication, RFID will most likely enhance the security. In 
addition to bar codes, the RFID information on the tag will contain the manufacturer’s 
data for verification to which manufacturer produced the product.  Of course, this 
assumes initial programming occurred correctly.  Spoofing tags is a threat that thieves or 
spies could attempt (Weis, Sarma, Rivest, & Engels, 2003) to threaten authentication.  
The spoofing of tags would require someone to change tag information or replace the 
original tag with a different one.  Since the tags used in the network are read-only, 
changing tag information would only really become a threat if read-write tags were the 
standard.  As for replacing a tag, this requires someone to physically remove the present 
tag and replace it with a spoofed tag.  This scenario would present a much greater threat 
to the retail market for changing prices, should RFID become the primary means of check 
out at a store.  This is still possible with the UPC bar codes, but switching UPC bar codes 
does not seem to be a widespread problem.  An example of a government threat for 
spoofing would be if someone stole the contents of a pallet or case and delivered the 
container with the tag affixed.  Upon delivery, the empty container and tag would show 
the item as delivered.  Although plausible, spoofing does not currently pose a widespread 
or unique concern to the DoD passive network.  The same scenario is just as possible 
with the bar code enabled network, and although it would go unnoticed for a little longer 
since it would show up as delivered.  In addition, the physical tampering required to 
spoof a tag aids the security of the network.  The spoofing of tags could be done to 
confuse the network, and although it would create confusion, the impact would be 
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limited, so it seems difficult to envision an example of why someone would do this or 
how this could pose a serious threat to the network.  For the reasons discussed above, the 
threat of spoofing tags is not a serious threat to the network, and the benefit of verifying 
the tag information with the bar code and human readable information provides 
redundancy to enhance the component of authentication. 
RFID should enhance the availability of the information since RFID will provide 
an additional method of data capture to bar codes and thus allow another way to obtain 
the information about the product.  As RFID becomes the primary method of data 
capture, the potential for a denial-of-service attack could threaten the availability (Weis et 
al., 2003).  The denial-of-service attack would have to interrupt communication between 
the reader and the tag or the reader and the database.  Accomplishing this requires the 
placement of some sort of jamming device in proximity to the tag or the reader, or by 
killing the tags sometime before they reach their destination.  Although this could be 
annoying, the bar codes will still be available as they provide an additional layer of 
redundancy should the RFID tags become unavailable.  While the threat of a denial-of-
service attack is possible, the added redundancy of RFID to bar codes should ultimately 
increase the availability of information. 
Again, the redundancy of using both bar codes and RFID tags will also help the 
integrity of the data.  Bar codes are reproducible from most any computer and printer 
(Hulme & Claburn, 2004), so tampering could occur.  RFID tags are more difficult to 
reproduce and hiding them within the packaging will reduce tampering.  Spoofing a tag 
could threaten the integrity of the information, but as addressed in the authentication 
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section, this threat appears minimal.  In addition, a parity check between the information 
on the RFID tag and the bar code increases the ability to check the integrity of the data. 
Utilizing RFID will probably be stronger against the threat of non-repudiation.  
The current databases used to track inventory with bar codes will either grow to 
incorporate RFID or will remain similar.  The verification of the data being sent back and 
forth between the supplier and the DoD locations will most likely remain unchanged, but 
verifying the sender’s identity and that the shipment was received is accomplished with 
less difficulty.  The use of the serial numbers with RFID allows for would increase 
against non-repudiation since each item can be identified individually.  Identification of 
individual cases allows receiving locations to determine exactly which cases were 
received and which are missing.     
The element of confidentiality provides potential for larger problems.  The 
protection of the tags from unauthorized reading could be a new cause of concern for the 
DoD.  The main protection from confidentiality for the tag is the maximum read distance 
of 15 meters (Cravotta, 2004); although read distances most likely remain closer to the 
minimum read distance directed by the DoD at 3 meters (The Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2004a).  According to the current design of the network, without encryption,  
“When queried by a reader, a tag sends the data to the reader using radio 
waves; the transmission is completely in the clear and the system has no 
inherent security.  Further, any given reader can read just about any RFID 
tag, no matter who owns it.  This can create security nightmares for 
companies worried about the privacy and integrity of their data.” (Fisher, 
2004, p. 1) 
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Therefore, once within a few meters, there remains no way to stop anyone from reading 
the tags, nor any way to know or record who, where, or when the tag was read. 
 RFID has possible implications on security.  On one extreme, RFID will 
strengthen security as an additional data capture technique and will largely serve to 
benefit integrity, authentication, non-repudiation and availability.  Spoofing and denial-
of-service are potential attacks that could threaten authentication and availability, 
respectively.  However, both are currently minimal threats as there is no real reason to 
spoof tags, and a denial-of-service would be inconvenient and limited in scope since it 
requires a physical local presence, but bar codes are still available should this occur.  
RFID tags offer another form of redundancy when combined with bar codes or human 
readable labels.  The confidentiality aspect continues to be debated since the potential 
exists for propagation of large amounts of information without detection.   
   
Privacy Issues 
While the DoD may have concerns for the confidentiality of the passive RFID 
network, the commercial sector has been experiencing significant friction from privacy 
groups.  The unfortunate drawback of RFID derives from the same attribute that makes it 
so useful—the ability to quickly pass unique information.  According to privacy groups, 
tracking everything about anyone becomes too easy with RFID.  Jeremy Wagstaff, a 
writer for the Far East Economic Review said it well,  
“What I don’t want is an RFID tag on every product, banknote and stored-
value card I have, transmitting information about me that allows shop 
clerks, bank tellers, policemen and my mother to know where I’ve been, 
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what I’m wearing, how much money I have in my pocket and what 
diseases I’m entertaining.  That’s not about to happen, but the technology 
allows for it.  And some retailers would love it.” (2003, p. 31)  
The information collected from consumers like shopping habits and brand loyalty 
can be very valuable as Wagstaff alluded, and currently the developers of systems are the 
manufactures of the technology and the retailers or vendors—the public seems 
uninvolved and uninformed of the potential privacy invasions that could result.  Beth 
Givens, director of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse commented, “RFID is essentially 
invisible and can result in both profiling and locational tracking of consumers without 
their knowledge or consent” (Vijanyan, 2003, p. 5).  Privacy activists were alarmed when 
Wal-Mart and Procter & Gamble tested RFID tags on lipstick in the summer of 2003.  
Webcams reportedly allowed researchers in Cincinnati to watch customers shopping for 
lipstick in Oklahoma (Bednarz, 2003, p. 10).  The activists have worked to inform the 
public and slow the implementation of RFID.  The group, CASPIAN (Consumers 
Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering) organized numerous boycotts 
against retailers like Tesco and suppliers like Gillette (CASPIAN, 2005), and proposed 
legislation with the “RFID Right to Know Act of 2003” to “protect consumers against 
unwittingly purchasing products embedded with remote surveillance devices” (Albecht, 
2005, p. 1).  The concerns of CASPIAN and other groups caused legislators in Utah, 
California, and Missouri to attempt to pass legislation for retailers to inform consumers of 
tagged products (Collins, 2004a).  Pro-RFID businesses claim that, “hypothetical 
scenarios of possible RFID abuses promoted by privacy groups are prompting the 
introduction of legislation to curtail the deployment of RFID before the technology has 
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ever been put to use” (2004, p. 1).  Robert Atkinson, a vice president for the Progressive 
Policy Institute, says, the privacy groups are “spinning a whole set of worst-case 
scenarios” to scare the public and that, “In the past, after a technology, like bar coding, 
has been introduced, consumer concerns quickly abate” (2004, p. 1).  The debate between 
privacy groups and Pro-RFID groups will almost certainly continue for a few years.  
 The concerns of the privacy groups center around the reading of tags on items a 
person is carrying.  Although this could be severe under certain circumstances, the 
information collected would most likely relate to the clothes worn or items purchased 
from a store.  The worst-case scenario may offend some people, but the result would 
probably resemble the hassles of spam E-Mail from advertisers or information collected 
from frequent buyer shopping cards.  It seems that RFID tags, containing the information 
of a bar code with a serial number, should not cause people to fear for their personal 
safety.  Regardless of one’s stance on this issue or assessment of the vulnerability, the 
privacy groups have done a remarkable job of drawing attention to potential security 
concerns.  A study by market intelligence company, BIGresearch, found that, “Nearly 
two thirds of RFID-aware adults are ‘very concerned’ or ‘somewhat concerned’ about 
[potential privacy] abuses” (Roberti, 2004b, p. 1).  From the evidence suggested by the 
boycotts, legislation attempts, and surveys, the concerns of the privacy groups, whether 
they have merit or not, are effectively being heard by a segment of the consumer 
population.   
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Security Implications Unique for the DoD 
Concerns for the government and military could mirror the privacy concerns 
voiced by the public.  It seems logical to assume that any potential vulnerability 
experienced by the public, where the biggest concern is consumer privacy, would 
compound in severity in the DoD’s realm of military operations.  In order to keep RFID 
tags cheap for tracking a huge number of manufactured items, the current passive EPC 
data construct proposals and the DoD tag construct do not utilize encryption.  Further, the 
DoD Directive, Number 8100.2, that establishes the policy for wireless devices, services, 
and technologies in the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG) explicitly states that, “Radio 
Frequency (RF) energy between RF identification tags, both active and passive, and the 
reader/interrogator does not require encryption” (2004, p. 2).  Alan Estevez, assistant 
deputy undersecretary of defense for supply chain integration, provided two reasons why 
the network does not need encryption,  
“One reason is that the information on the passive tag is simply a serial 
number that means nothing until it’s associated with information in a 
database, and the second reason is potential enemies should not be able to 
get close enough to read the tags.” (Roberti, 2004a, p. 1)   
He continued on the second reason stating that, “If we have people within 10 feet 
who are able to read a passive tag—or even 300 feet for an active tag—then we have 
bigger problems than them knowing what items are in our supply chain” (2004a, p. 1).  
The DoD cedes the fact that although unlikely, anyone with a RFID receiver with an 860-
960 UHF frequency band capability and in close enough proximity can passively read 
any RFID tag.  If the person can then couple the tag information, as Mr. Estevez alludes, 
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with the EPC Manager or the CAGE code, he or she would be able to calculate who made 
the product, and the serial and class codes could tell exactly what product passed the 
reader.  The difficulty of coupling the tag information with what product it identifies 
remains unclear.  The EPC Manager code is determined from the Object Name Service 
(ONS), which is a method of assigning manufacturers a unique code that they can then 
use as the prefix to assign product numbers and serial numbers under the object class and 
serial number fields.  EPCglobal recently outsourced the management of the ONS 
directory to VeriSign, Inc. (Collins, 2004b).  Beth Lovett, solutions marketing manager 
for VeriSign, expects that firewalls and access-management tools will ensure data 
remains safe from unauthorized parties on the EPCglobal network (Hulme & Claburn, 
2004).  The CAGE code for the DoD construct is managed by the DoD, and should be 
more difficult to access a database with all the codes listed.  With either construct, once a 
company’s EPC Manager code or CAGE code is available, the manufacturer will be 
obvious from reading the tag.  The CAGE code is printed in the “From” address section 
of a Military Shipping Label (Department of Defense Standard Practice, 2004, p. 29), so 
although the CAGE code addresses are not available widespread in a database, they are 
certainly not viewed as sensitive information.  Protection from unauthorized reading of 
the tags could then extend beyond the reaches of the military warehouse or even the base 
that they were located.  Bottleneck locations, such as the commercial gates for entry or 
exit from a base could serve as collection points to read RFID tags.   
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Enhancing the Security of RFID 
The fears consumer privacy groups identified have also become a concern of 
retailers and manufacturers in the realm of industrial espionage.  Dan Bailey, an RFID 
architect at RSA Laboratories notes that, “Most RFID pilots have no security at all…It’s 
almost like the early day of cell phones where no one paid attention to security.  The 
system is all fine and good if you trust the reader, but if not, you have problems.  People 
just haven’t thought about this stuff” (Fisher, 2004, p. 1).  Steve Lewis outlines three 
different methods in which industrial espionage could take place:  Eavesdropping, where 
a listener can figure out tag numbers through the anti-collision methods of the reader, 
hiding readers along a supply chain, using hand held readers (2004).  The first method of 
eavesdropping is unique because it involves unauthorized reading of the tags through the 
transmissions emitted by the reader.  Since the reader transmissions are stronger than the 
tag’s returning signal, obtaining the transmissions could occur from a much greater range 
than the tag can be read at, up to an approximate distance of 100 meters (Weis et al., 
2003; Ranasinghe, Engels, & Cole, 2004).  The other two possibilities involve simply 
reading and tracking the tags from a much closer range of a few meters.   
Research found six different methods of enhancing security for a passive RFID 
network:  physical security, the “kill tag” approach, the Faraday Cage, cryptography, 
silent tree walking, and blocker tags.  Theoretically, the easiest way to protect an RFID 
network is to ensure that unauthorized people cannot enter a close enough proximity of 
any tags or readers to intercept any wireless transmissions.  In actuality, this technique is 
difficult since the network encompasses the tags from the point of manufacture to 
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whenever they separate from the product.  The physical security of DoD installations 
provides an enormous boost compared to corporate users.   
The next method is the kill tag approach.  This method offers protection to 
consumers by killing the tag upon purchase.  Physically breaking the tag or sending it a 
kill command with a short 8-bit password will kill a tag (Juels, Rivest, & Szydlo, 2003).  
This technique is not a feasible option for the DoD since the tags need to remain active 
throughout the DoD supply chain to reap the benefits of RFID.  The method, if fully 
utilized with retailers, should soothe consumers since they currently have no need for the 
tags to remain active after purchase.   
The Faraday Cage method takes advantage of the inability of radio signals to pass 
through metal.  A Faraday Cage is a metal mesh or foil that blocks the transmission 
between the tag and the reader (Juels et al., 2003).  This technique could prove to be very 
effective for blocking certain tags that are more important, or it could serve to protect 
tags as they pass through a less secure environment.  Ensuring products are shipped in 
metal containers will provide the same effect as a Faraday Cage, as the container will not 
allow radio frequencies to pass.  Additionally, this technique is a very simple and cost 
effective method to protect tags from unauthorized reading.   
Cryptographic methods are another way of increasing security.  At the current 
cost designs for tags in the DoD and EPC tag protocols, “providing strong cryptographic 
primitives is currently not a realistic option” (Weis et al., 2003).  Despite the limitations 
on the tags, cryptographic hash functions relying on the back-end, the reader and the 
database, increase the security of the network.  One example of this is the hash-lock 
approach; the tags only release a simple form of identification for themselves termed the 
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“metaID.”  The metaID is sent to the reader that communicates with the database where it 
finds the corresponding key to the metaID.  The reader sends the key information to the 
tag, and the tag then sends the information (Juels et al., 2003; Henrici & Müller, 2004; 
Weis et al., 2003).  This method increases the security since accessing the information on 
the tag requires a key to unlock it, however, the metaID is unique, and so the tracking of 
the tag is still possible.  Other derivations of hash functions designed to alleviate metaID 
tracking include randomized hash-locking (Weis et al., 2003) and hash-based 
identification variation (Henrici & Müller, 2004).  Both have drawbacks as randomized 
hash-locking is scaleable to only a small number of tags and hash-based identification 
variation requires that the tags are read/write (Henrici & Müller, 2004).  The use of 
hashing functions offers an increase in security through cryptography while maintaining 
the possibility for cheap tags.  Incorporating cryptography into the DoD passive RFID 
network would require significant changes to the tags and the supporting databases.   
As mentioned earlier, eavesdropping is a method of overhearing the transmissions 
sent from the reader to the tag to discern tag information.   Anti-collision techniques 
allow readers to avoid data collision to collect the information from multiple tags that are 
simultaneously in the reader’s coverage (Accenture, 2001).  Tree-walking is a method of 
anti-collision, in which, the reader and tags within the reader field communicate bits back 
and forth to isolate tag information.  Silent tree-walking is a security enhancing form of 
anti-collision where the reader does not rebroadcast the tag information, or will send 
“chaff” commands to confuse eavesdroppers, (Weis et al., 2003).  Juels, Rivest, and 
Szydlo note that, “’silent tree-walking’ and ‘hash-lock’ approaches for constructing 
‘smart’ RFID tags…involve cryptographic operations on tags.  Such approaches are thus 
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unlikely to be economically practical for the near future,” (2003: 105-106).  In spite of 
the current impracticality of these two techniques, they should remain open for 
consideration as the technology matures and costs become more feasible. 
The final security enhancing technique evaluated is the blocker tag.  Developed 
by RSA Security, the blocker tag is a passive tag placed in proximity to other tags that 
interferes with the tree-walking anti-collision technique by broadcasting both a “1” and a 
“0” bit simultaneously (2003).  The affect is a denial-of-service on the reader as the tags 
passes through the reader’s view (Hulme & Claburn, 2004).  This technique would not 
cause any long-term effects on either the reader or other tags, but would cause tags in 
proximity to the blocker tag to become unreadable.  This technique could benefit the 
security of the DoD passive network since it is an inexpensive and simple way to prevent 
unauthorized reading of tags.  The blocker tag would need to be removed prior to use so 
that the DoD readers would receive the information.  Unfortunately, the blocker tag could 
also be used in a malicious capability to cause a denial-of-service attack against the DoD 
network.  While this is a much more severe threat to commercial check out applications, 
the blocker tag would need to remain physically within the reader’s view.   
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter evaluated RFID technology, described security and privacy 
implications, and offered techniques for improving the security of the DoD passive RFID 
network.  This chapter will serve as the foundation for the evaluation of security in 
relation to the network. 
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III. Methodology 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter introduces the basics of historical research, discusses the value 
historical research gives to the Management Information Systems (MIS) field, and 
explains the application of the methodology to the research problem and investigative 
questions. 
 
Research Methodology 
 Searching for a methodology to answer the research and investigative questions 
proved to be more difficult than expected.  The goal of the research is to provide a 
security assessment to a network that does not currently exist.  The technology and layout 
have been determined, but changes will occur as it approaches full implementation across 
nearly all DoD installations.  Despite the large amount of literature dealing with security 
of the public open EPC network, no peer reviewed literature was found relating security 
to the DoD passive RFID network.  As O’Brien, Remenyi, and Keaney explain, “The 
object of academic research into business and management studies is to add something of 
value to the body of knowledge” (2004, p. 137).  This research certainly seeks to add to 
the body of knowledge by analyzing the technical discipline of RFID with a security 
posture.  
Several methodologies received consideration for the research.  A case study 
methodology was an option, but without the full plan or deployment of the network, this 
would significantly reduce the scope of the research.  Content analysis also had potential, 
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but due to the two separate bodies of knowledge, an element of context would have been 
lost.  Historical research proved to be the research method of choice.  Historical research, 
“considers the currents and countercurrents of present and past events, with the hope of 
discerning patterns that tie them all together…historical research deals with the meaning 
of events” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2000, p. 172).  Certainly, establishing and evaluationing 
facts is important for any type of research, but for historical research, the goal is slightly 
different.  Leedy & Ormrod explain, “The historical method is not, as with any other type 
of research, the accumulation of the facts, but rather the interpretation of the facts,” 
(2000, p. 172).  The interpretation of facts is the differentiating factor between historical 
and other methods or research.  Interpreting the facts offers context into the subject of 
study.     
“Historiography can offer the business and management researcher an 
opportunity to acquire a rich understanding of situations and the context in 
which they exist.  Knowing the background to any situation or to any issue 
enhances our comprehension and improves our ability to see what is 
important and what is not.” (O’Brien et al., 2004, p. 135) 
Therefore, insight into past events will allow an increased understanding of importance.  
Determining what is important and what is not, is the basis for making decisions.  “Any 
understanding of a phenomenon or a situation will usually have to be based on a 
knowledge and appreciation of the trajectory of circumstances which have lead up to it” 
(O’Brien et al., 2004, p. 136).  Past decisions are the result of past circumstances; so 
intuitively, all decisions currently made are the result of past circumstances.  Therefore, 
“history helps endow knowledge with wisdom so that it can be used effectively by 
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leaders and decision makers,” (Mason, McKenney, & Copeland, 1997a, p. 259).  The 
ultimate goal of historical research is to interpret facts in context to allow for leaders and 
decision makers to make better decisions.    
 
Historical Research and MIS 
The technologies used around the world today are the result of past circumstances 
and decisions.  “History provides the context within IS [Information Systems] 
phenomena occur.  History allows the researcher to follow a trail and illuminates the role 
of decision making in shaping events,” (Bannister, 2002, p. 7).  Without the historical 
element, the intricate reasons for the decisions are not apparent.  Mason, McKenney, and 
Copeland noticed this, “MIS researchers, for the most part, have not sought to identify 
fully the broad socio-economic conditions of continuity and change that accompany the 
use of information technology” (1997a, p. 258).  The impacts of these decisions have 
determined how technology exists today.  “Markets and basis of competition in an 
industry are changed—sometimes radically—by the decisions managers make when they 
select and invest in technology” (Mason et al., 1997a, p. 271).  The goal of this research 
is to provide an interpretation of facts in context that will aid leaders and decision makers 
to make better decisions relating to security and the DoD passive RFID network.  
  
Approach 
Two historical methodologies received consideration for this research.  The first 
was a framework developed by O’Brien et al. as a method for use in business and 
management studies.  It is composed of a nine-step process.  The nine steps are: 
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1. The Research Question 
2. The Relevance Check 
3. The Scope of the Research 
4. Sources of Evidence 
5. Assessment of Methods of Analysis 
6. Assembling the Evidence 
7. Developing the Story  
8. Critiquing the Story 
9. The Outcome of the Research (2004, pp. 138-141) 
The design of second framework, developed by Mason et al., is specifically for 
application to MIS research.  This framework consists of a seven-step process, and the 
steps are listed below.   
1. Begin with Focusing Questions 
2. Specify the Domain 
3. Gather Evidence 
4. Critique the Evidence 
5. Determine Patterns 
6. Tell the Story—the Account 
7. Write the Transcript (1997b, pp. 312-317) 
Although the two frameworks differ in the number of steps that they consist of, 
they are actually very similar.  The table below demonstrates a comparison of how the 
researcher sees the two methodologies overlapping. 
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Table 3:  A Comparison of Two Historical Methodologies (Mason et al., 1997b; 
O’Brien et al., 2004) 
(Mason et al., 1997b) (O'Brien et al., 2004) 
1.  The Research Question 1.  Focusing Questions 
2.  The Relevance Check 
2.  Specify the Domain 3.  The Scope of Research 
3.  Gather the Evidence 4.  Sources of Evidence 
4.  Critique the 
Evidence 
5.  Assessment of Methods 
of Analysis 
6.  Assembling the Evidence 5.  Determine Patterns 
7.  Developing the Story 
6.  Tell the Story 8.  Critiquing the Story 
7.  Write the Transcript 9.  Outcome of the Research 
 
The theories certainly overlap in many areas.  The process for conducting the 
research seems very similar with both methods:  begin with questions, scope the research, 
gather evidence, evaluate the evidence, determine patterns, and produce some sort of an 
output of the research.  For the purposes of this research, either methodology would 
accomplish the research effort, but ultimately, the Mason et al. framework was a better 
option as its specific development for MIS aligned better with the topic of research.   
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presented the methodological portion of the research by first defining 
historical research, highlighting the value it adds to the MIS area of study, and finally 
explaining the methodology chosen.   
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IV. Analysis 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this research was to utilize historical analysis to evaluate potential 
security concerns or issues for the DoD passive RFID network as it exists today or as the 
design proposes for the future.  The review of the literature completed in chapter II will 
serve as the evidence for the research and investigative questions.   
 
Investigative Questions 
IQ1.  How will the passive RFID network affect the five components of IA? 
 Many different methods are available to assess security.  The logical choice to 
assess the security of a DoD network was IA since it is one of the primary methods 
recommended for defensive IO in Joint Publication 3-13 (1998, p. III-1).  The five 
components of IA, authentication, availability, integrity, non-repudiation, and 
confidentiality, provide a structure for analyzing the network.  Although the potential 
threats of either spoofing or denial-of-service attacks could cause problems for 
authentication and availability, respectively, neither currently poses a serious threat.  
Spoofing involves changing or manipulating the information.  As long as the tags are 
read-only on the network, the threat of spoofing an RFID tag is the same as switching out 
a bar code for a product.  The main difference is that reproducing an RFID tag is slightly 
more difficult.  While a denial-of-service attack would not allow the network to operate, 
it would have to occur from a close physical proximity, which should make it easier to 
identify, and the bar codes will remain an available method of data capture.  For these 
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reasons, these two potential threats are not serious, and the passive RFID network either 
increased the security or caused no change for four out of the five components: 
authentication, availability, integrity, and non-repudiation.  Adding RFID as another form 
of data capture provides more redundancy.  This redundancy will enhance the security of 
authentication, availability, and integrity since a comparison of the two methods can 
provide a verification of the information on methods.  The component of non-repudiation 
is enhanced since RFID allows for unique serial numbers for identification down to the 
case level.  The analysis of the five components assumes that everything from the reader 
back, including databases, is standard software and hardware protected on the DoD 
intranet.  The fifth component of confidentiality causes concern.  The network allows for 
potential security issues since the information on the tags has little protection once any 
reader is within range.  The information on the tags is susceptible to unauthorized access, 
and the tags have no capability to report the unauthorized reading by a third party.   
IQ2.  What are possible methods for unauthorized people to gain information? 
Three methods an adversary could gain are eavesdropping, covertly hiding 
readers along the supply chain, and handheld readers.  Eavesdropping attempts to take 
advantage of the stronger reader signal, which can extend up to 100 meters.  Again, all 
communication between readers and tags occurs without encryption, so the readers allow 
for interception of information up to this distance.  To gain the information, a device 
capable of intercepting the RF transmissions (like a computer with an antenna and 
appropriate software) is located within the broadcast range of the reader.  The device 
would either store information locally or send the information over a network to another 
location.  The device would focus on the anti-collision techniques of the reader to 
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determine which tags are passing the reader.  The other two methods focus not on the 
reader, but on the reading of the tags. The maximum read distance for tags is 3 to 15 
meters under optimal conditions.  Hiding readers along the supply chain to record the 
passing of items requires placing a reader covertly within the supply chain.  Bottleneck 
locations like installation gates or warehouses would be ideal to maximize the amount of 
information gained.   Handheld readers are the final method evaluated for an adversary to 
gain information.  This method requires a handheld reader and a person to get within the 
tag read range.  Optical bar codes have this same vulnerability, but RFID allows non-line-
of-sight reading at a rate of hundreds of reads per second (Weis et al., 2003).  
Theoretically, one person equipped with a handheld RFID reader could walk through a 
warehouse and collect the information from every tag.  The last two methods for reading 
tags could occur anywhere the tag and product go, whether on or off an installation.  
These three methods are three likely scenarios in which an adversary could gain 
information from the RFID tags or readers. 
IQ3.  What information will an adversary gain if he or she is able to read the data on 
the tag? 
 The two different tag protocols authorized for the network increase the 
complexity of this question.  It is unclear whether the EPC or the DoD tag protocols will 
become a majority on the network.  The EPC protocol may have an advantage since 
suppliers can use the same construct for public distribution.  The EPC protocol contains 
three main information areas of interest:  the EPC manager, the object class, and the 
serial number.  The DoD protocol also contains three main information areas of interest:  
the filter, the CAGE code, and the serial number.  The filter value would tell how the 
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item was packaged and is found in the DoD specifications (The Under Secretary of 
Defense, 2004).  The manufacturer is contained in the EPC manager, and the CAGE code 
for EPC and DoD constructs, respectively.  Seeing the tag in a stream of bits does not 
mean that the manufacturer is readily apparent.  The information needs pairing with EPC 
ONS information or DoD CAGE code information to determine what company received 
assignment of the unique value.  Estimating the feasibility of this is extremely difficult.  
Currently this information is not readily available, but with the further propagation of the 
technology, it could become easier to pair since most do not consider the information 
sensitive.  The product tag information is contained in the object class section of the EPC 
tag and the CAGE code or serial number for the DoD tag.  The product information will 
differentiate between the products produced by the same manufacturer.  Once the 
manufacturer has an approved range of prefixes for the EPC ONS, it can assign the 
product codes itself, so this information should be harder to ascertain than the 
manufacturer.  In a worst-case scenario where the tag information yields the 
manufacturer and the product, the most information available for an adversary would 
place a certain product at a certain location at a certain time.  For one product or 
shipment, this poses little threat, but the ability to monitor all shipments entering or 
exiting a warehouse, and installation, or multiple installations could pose a threat.  
However, the logistics required to covertly collect and track this information would 
parallel a conspiracy theory.    
IQ4.  What are potential options that could increase the security of the network 
should that become necessary? 
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 Should more security become necessary in the future, the analysis of six different 
techniques (physical security, killing the tag, the Faraday Cage, cryptography, silent tree-
walking, and blocker tags) proves a decent starting point.  Of the six, killing the tag is 
probably the only technique that should not receive consideration since it disabling the 
tag defeats the purpose of RFID.  Physical security and the Faraday Cage are two 
relatively inexpensive techniques currently used even if it is unknowingly.  By keeping 
tags and readers away from the read distances, this denies the loss of information.  DoD 
installations provide relatively good physical security.  In addition, by transporting items 
in metal railcars or shipping containers, the interference of the metal on the radio signals 
helps to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information, which acts as a Faraday Cage.  
Focusing and refining these two techniques, along with a more thorough and strict policy 
could significantly improve the security of the network should that become necessary.  
The final three techniques, cryptography, silent tree-walking, and blocker tags, require 
increased tag and reader technology than what the minimal EPC and DoD tag constructs 
possess.   These techniques will require more testing and further industry adoption before 
they are viable methods of enhancing security.  The DoD should continue to consider and 
pursue these techniques as alternatives for increasing the security of the network.    
 
Research Question 
Does the present design of DoD passive RFID network cause any serious security 
concerns that could be exploited by adversaries now or in the future? 
The network poses no serious security concerns to the four of the five components 
of IA.  Confidentiality is the only component that has real potential for security concerns.  
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However, given the physical security of the DoD installations, the difficulty to pair tag 
information with the manufacturer and product, and the complexity required to collect 
and process a large volume of information, the confidentiality of the tags does not pose a 
serious security threat for the very near future.  The confidentiality of the network 
remains a concern since the network does have the potential to yield large amounts of 
information regarding movement within the DoD supply chain.  Security needs to remain 
a significant concern for the network to respond to this threat and others since the 
network is extremely dynamic and threats can surface quickly.   
 
Chapter Overview 
  This chapter utilized the literature review of chapter II to answer the investigative 
and research questions for the research.  
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V.  Conclusions  
 
Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the research effort.  It will discuss the findings of the 
study, make recommendations, address limitations, and it will propose topics for future 
research. 
 
Discussion 
This study intends to draw increased attention to security associated with the DoD 
passive RFID network.  Since this network remains in its infancy, changes to policy, 
technology, or design will be easier and cheaper than at any time in the future.  The 
privacy concern witnessed in the consumer deployment of this technology should cause 
additional consideration for the DoD deployment.  The typical concern of consumers is 
disclosure of personal information that subjects them to increases in advertising and 
marketing.  In the military realm, disclosure of supply chain movement could give insight 
into operations that could jeopardize lives or mission success.   
An additional observation made by the researcher was the polarization regarding 
security caused by the privacy debate in the consumer realm.  The success of the privacy 
groups’ concerns may have caused a backlash among the RFID community.  The mention 
of eavesdropping on an RFID network seems to threaten the positive work and 
accomplishments of this revolutionary technology.  This behavior is common to many 
Information Technology (IT) initiatives.  IA is often an afterthought that can complicate 
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the initial design that was so painstakingly developed.  Both sides of the debate will 
benefit to compromise and constructively entertain reasonable scenarios in the future.   
 
Recommendations 
This research concludes that the DoD passive RFID network currently does not 
pose any serious security threats, but security of the network should receive evaluation as 
the technology becomes ubiquitous.  Weis et al. recommend that, “RFID-enabled 
environments should be equipped with devices to detected unauthorized read attempts or 
transmissions on tag frequencies” (2003, p. 10).  This is a great idea that would enhance 
security, although deploying these devices to every RFID-enable site could be excessive.  
Despite the current lack of serious vulnerabilities, the potential still exists for threats to 
confidentiality in the future.  The primary recommendation is to increase the monitoring 
for security vulnerabilities of this network.  An organization must be responsible for the 
security of the network whether it is the offices pushing the implementation, the DoD 
Automatic Identification Technology (AIT) office and the service AIT offices or the 
emission security (EMSEC) program.   According to the Air Force emission security 
instruction, AFI33-203, EMSEC is concerned with denying access to compromising 
emanations and “EMSEC mostly supports the ‘confidentiality’ requirement [of IA]” 
(2002, p. 4).  This makes the EMSEC program the most logical choice for implementing 
security procedures.  In either case, some organization must take ownership for ensuring 
the security of the network as more threats emerge.  It is not enough to determine the 
network secure and continue without regard for the future.     
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Limitations 
Historical analysis is unique because the researcher serves as the instrument of 
interpretation.  One element of concern is the bias of the researcher.  Borg and Gall 
addressed this writing, “the researcher’s bias can affect the results as much in a 
laboratory experiment as in historical inquiry” (Borg & Gall, 1983, p. 801).  A 
researcher’s work within a similar field as a study, such as the IT field, causes some sort 
of bias.  Although the elimination of researcher bias is not possible, it needs minimization 
through objectivity and dutiful application of the methodology.   
This research involved the collection of a significant amount of literature.  Books, 
peer-reviews journals, electronic databases, and websites all received thorough 
investigation for information pertaining to the subject.  However, classified literature 
received no consideration for the purposes of this research, and sources of proprietary 
research were unavailable due to cost constraints.   
Much of the literature surrounding passive RFID comes from a small community 
of experts.  Many of the writers have their own biases or agendas toward the application 
of this new network or technology.  To combat this, all points of view received 
consideration to better balance the extremes.  Overall, the bias minimized as much as 
possible with additional weight given to sources that disputed multiple points of view.   
This research looked specifically at the security of the communication between 
the tag and reader.  This wireless transmission of information with an open protocol is 
what makes the passive DoD RFID network unique.  The security of the databases and 
software utilized were not evaluated for two reasons.  The first was that this is not yet 
standardized or ready for implementation.  The second reason was because the databases 
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and software will ride on the DoD intranet, the intranet will provide security in a more 
traditional sense of IA related to computers and networks.   
Another concern of the research was that both the technology and the literature 
were very dynamic.  The open passive RFID networks for commercial companies and the 
DoD are undergoing constant changes.  Without the network fully deployed, substantial 
changes can occur as issues arise.  Shortfalls pointed out through this research can 
receive quick response, or may already been addressed.   
 
Suggestions for Further Study 
Suggestion #1:  The Department of Defense’s passive RFID network is only at its 
earliest stages of development.  Currently only two receiving locations for the DoD 
require suppliers to provide RFID tags and that is only for a few classes of products.  As 
the network expands to more locations, a case study looking at the specific security of 
one or a small number of these locations would provide valuable research.  Although not 
necessary, the study would benefit from the use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
readers to help search for vulnerabilities.  A designed experiment would serve as an 
appropriate methodology for the study.  The research would determine specific locations 
and methods that may be vulnerable to a certain installation.   
Suggestion #2:  All products traveling through the DoD supply chain are not 
equal in relation to defensive IO.  The transportation of tanks and chemical warfare 
equipment probably yield more information into U.S. military operations than boots or 
office supplies.  Research in the form of a survey or a Delphi study could help to 
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determine what products traveling through the supply chain need greater precaution for 
RFID security or any method of data capture.   
Suggestion #3:  The assumption surrounding RFID is a savings of time and 
money.  Deploying this network has a cost to both the DoD and suppliers.  Research 
quantifying the time or monetary savings could help determine whether the DoD is 
getting a sufficient return on investment (ROI).  This research would help verify or 
disprove the assumption and discover if RFID tagging should continue down to the item 
level.  The possible increase in accuracy or timeliness of the information would serve as 
additional factors for the study.  A cost-benefit analysis is a feasible methodology for this 
research.   
 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarized the research effort.  It restated the findings of the 
research, offered recommendations, highlighted limitations, and provided topics for 
future study. 
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 
 
   
 ALOC Air Lines of Communication 
 CAGE Commercial and Government Entity 
 CENTCOM U. S. Central Command 
 COTS Commercial of the Shelf Technology 
 DDC Defense Distribution Center 
 DLA Defense Logistic Agency 
 DoD Department of Defense 
  DODAAC Department of Defense Activity Address Code 
  EAN European Article Numbering  
  EM Electromagnetic 
  EMSEC Emission Security 
 EPC Electronic Product Code 
 GIG Global Information Grid 
 IA Information Assurance 
 IO Information Operations 
 IT Information Technology 
 MIS Management Information Systems 
 NSTISSI  National Security Telecommunications and 
  Information Systems Instruction 
 ONS Object Name Service 
 RF Radio Frequency 
 RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
 ROI Return on Investment 
 UCC Uniform Code Council 
 UHF Ultra High Frequency 
 UID Unique Identification 
 UPC Universal Product Code 
 VOIP  Voice Over Internet Protocol   
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